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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

THE MORTGAGES IN POSSESSION IN NEW YoRKc AND IN MIcHIGAN.-It is in-

teresting to observe how tenaciously the old common law of mortgages has
persisted in the state of New York, the very cradle of the modem lien theory of
the mortgage. As early as 18o2 Chancellor KENT began the importation into
that state of Lord MANSFIELD'S Civil Law doctrines of mortgage. Johnson v.
Hart,3 Johns. Cas. 322. In 1814, in the case of Runyan v. Mersereau, ii Johns.
534, the lien theory definitely triumphed over the old law. In other cases, both
before and since the statute of 1828 denying ejectment to the mortgagee, the
details of mortgage law were worked over to harmonize with the central
,theory.
Yet at all times there was a discordant element in the cases dealing with
the mortgagee in possession. This became most obvious in the case of Phyfe
v. Riley, 15 Wend. 248, decided by the Supreme Court in 1836. It was there
held that to an action of ejectment it was a complete defense to show that defendant was an assignee of a mortgage past due. Three distinct arguments are
advanced in the opinion: one of policy, that litigation and expense are saved by
permitting the mortgagee in possession to retain possession until redeemed,
instead of allowing him to be turned out by an action of ejectment and so
putting him to an action of foreclosure; an argument as to the technical
nature of a mortgage, that the mortgagee "is still considered as having the
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legal estate after condition broken"; and lastly the argument from authority,
with citation of earlier New York cases upon the mortgagee's right of possession. The argument of policy leaves us at best upon debatable ground.
The argument that the mortgagee had a legal title after default was out of
harmony with the later cases. And the argument from the authorities was
an appeal to decisions which were subject to reconsideration in the light of
the admittedly revolutionary theory of the mortgage at this time prevailing.
We may accept the ruling that the statute denying ejectment did not necessarily alter the substantive rights of the mortgagee, for there are several instances in which our law recognizes a right although there is no direct action
available for its enforcement, e. g., in the case of contracts unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds or the Statute of Limitations. The difficulty wis
that there had been a judicial amendment of the law of mortgages, which
made the recognition of a right of possession in the mortgagee an anachronism. This doctrine, however, found favor in the courts of New York (and
elsewhere, of course, but that is another story) so that by 1875 the anomaly
was imbedded in a dozen or more decisions and dicta.
In Phyfe v. Riley we are not told how the defendant got into possession,
and the only indication that the court attached any importance to that matter
lies in the observation that "ifthe mortgagee, after forfeiture, obtains possession in some legal anode," there is no reason for depriving him of it. "Legal
mode" was, of course, a question-begging expression, but it is quite clear that
it was not intended to limit the mortgagee to an entry under circumstances,
such as consent of the owner, which would legalize an entry by an entire
stranger. At the same time, obvious considerations of public policy prohibited the legalization of an entry by force, perhaps by fraud as well. Thus
the state of the law was fairly summed up by Drio, J., in Pell v. Ulmar, 18
N. Y. 139, in the dictum that, "if the mortgagee obtains possession without
force he is entitled" to hold it. Perhaps the most important application of
this doctrine was to the case of one who took possession under a defective
foreclosure. Thus in Fox v. Lipe, 24 Wend. 164, where ejectment was brought
against a mortgagee who had entered under a statutory foreclosure, it was
held to be unnecessary to decide whether the foreclosure was valid or void.
And in Townshend v. Thomson, 139 N. Y. 152, it was said, "A purchaser at
a mortgage foreclosure sale, defective and void as against the owner of the
equity of redemption because he was not made a party to the foreclosure
action, becomes a mortgagee in possession."
The last citation brings us down to 1893. In the meantime, however, a
counter tendency had begun to show itself. In the case of Howell v. Leavitt,
95 N. Y. 617, decided by the Court of Appeals in 1884, a mortgagee foreclosed
by action without making the owners of the equity of redemption parties,
purchased on the foreclosure sale, and, with the aid of a writ of assistance,
put out the party in possession, who was a tenant of the owners of the equity,
and so got into possession. The owners of the equity brought ejectment and
were successful. Emphasis was put upon the forcible method of gaining
possession, but Justice FiNcH, with characteristic force, showed the true
nature of the previously accepted doctrine of the mortgagee in possession as
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an isolated survival of an outworn creed. This case was followed, in i9os,
by Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, in which it was held that one who,
went into possession as lessee of a life tenant was not, by the purchase of an
outstanding mortgage, entitled to retain the possession after the death of the
life tenant, without the consent of the then owners. Emphasis was put upon
the defendant's covenant to surrender possession at the termination of the
lease and upon the fact that she never asserted any right of possession under
the mortgage, but the court again criticized adversely the old doctrine of the
mortgagee in possession.
The old doctrine was certainly shaken, but it was still possible to argue
that it remained the law of New York. The two cases last considered might,
upon their facts, stand with it in perfect harmony. The former was within
the long recognized exception as to possession forcibly obtained; the latter
might be regarded as a case of possession fraudulently obtained and be
classed. ivith Russellv. El, 2 Black (IT. S.) 575, where the leasehold was in
a third person who, without the consent of his lessor, delivered possession to
the mortgagee after the expiration of his lease.
But a further blow has now been struck at the old doctrine. In the case
of Hermann v. Cabinet Land Co., 217 N. Y. 526, im N. E. 476, decided by
the Court of Appeals in April, 19i6, the facts were like those of Howell v.
Leavitt, supra, except that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale appeared to
have taken possession without the use of force, so that the case came squarely
within the older authorities. The court, however, declined to distinguish the
case from that of Howell v. Leavitt, disposed of Townshend v. Thomson by
resting it upon acquiescence of the owner, again condemned the doctrine of
the older cases, and declared that in order to establish the rights of a mortgagee in possession, one must show entry with the consent of the owner, or
"otherwise lawful," the latter expression now clearly meaning, in the light
of all that is said in this case and that of Barson v. Mulligan, an entry which
would be lawful without aid of the mortgage, for "it is plain that the mortgagee has no means of getting possession that a stranger has not." (Barson
v. Mulligan.) The New York courts have arrived at last at the logical position which the Supreme Court of Michigan took when first presented with
this problem forty years ago. Newton v. McKay, 3o Mich. 380.
The lien theory of the mortgage might now seem to have completely triumphed in New York, and the problem of the mortgagee in possession to
have been finally solved. Ii is submitted, however, that some ground remains
to be cleared. It is the theory of the latest cases that the mortgagee has, by
virtue of his mortgage alone, no greater right to enter than a stranger-he
may enter only with the consent of the owner, or under other circumstances
(if any there be) which would authorize entry by a stranger. But suppose
he enters with the consent of the owner, what is his right then? If his mortgage gave him no more right to enter than a stranger's, does his mortgage
give his entry with the consent of the owner any greater effect than a similar
entry by the stranger? If not, is he more than a tenant at will? The Supreme
Court of Michigan has never gone further than to say that he cannot be
turned out without notice. Byers v. Byers, 65 Mich. 598. The Court of Ap-
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peals of New York has held, as late as the case of Townshend v. Thomson,
(now interpreted as resting on acquiescence,) that the mortgagee in possession can defend his possession until his mortgage is paid. That case has not
as yet been questioned as to this point, but it will be sooner or later and the
-courts will have to decide whether they will follow the logic of the lien theory
:further, or cling to this fragment of the older law.
_B. N. D.
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